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Abstract 
Deregulation in the electric power industry has been aimed at promoting competition and 
thereby enhancing the industry's efficiency. We use the auction data of public power 
procurements to study the impact of the reform on the retail power market in Japan. We 
quantify this impact by measuring a decline in power charges, controlling for the 
endogeneity bias caused by the entrants’ bid-submission decisions. Our results suggest that 
power charges would decline by about 0.48 yen/kWh on average when two or more providers 
bid at an auction. 
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1. Introduction 
 To design better electric power industry reforms, it is essential to measure the 
effects of regulatory reforms and examine their achievements. The impact of regulatory 
reforms on power charges is one of the clearest types of evidence for this purpose. We 
investigate how much the regulatory reform in the retail market of the power industry 
promoted competition between the incumbents and the entrants and consequently lowered 
power charges. We take a micro-data approach to this issue, using public power 
procurement auction data while paying attention to an endogeneity problem in the entrants’ 
decisions about whether to submit bids for individual auctions. 
 In 1995, Japan initiated a series of regulatory reforms toward market-oriented 
power industry by deregulating entry in the wholesale power market. While establishing 
new rules and regulations for fair and efficient uses of the power network under the new 
regime, new power companies, called power producers and suppliers (PPSs), were allowed to 
engage in the retailing business of electric power competing with the incumbents that had 
long regionally monopolized the power market in Japan. The scope of this retail market 
deregulation was first set to large-scale industrial and commercial customers using 2,000 
kW or more of ultra-high voltage (UHV) power, and then gradually enlarged to other 
middle-scale customers using 500 kW or more of high voltage power in 2004, and further to 
those using 50 kW or more in 2005. How significant was the impact of the reform on the 
retail power market? 
 Kainou (2007) examined power companies’ financial statements and found that the 
regional power companies had drastically restructured their investment and recurrent 
expenses to cut power charges in the 1990s by about 5%, anticipating the soon-coming 
severe competition induced by the reforms. The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 
(ANRE) (2004) conducted an analysis using auction data for power supply to government 
and other public entities, which explicitly report whether there was competition among 
power companies, or typically, between the incumbents and the PPSs. It divided the original 
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sample into two subsamples consisting of (A) samples with a single bidder and (B) samples 
with two or more bidders to compare the means of their power charges while controlling for 
effects of load factor.1,2 It found that, in the cases with load factors no higher than 50%, the 
mean of the power charges in Group A was higher than that in Group B. That is, the 
competition led to a charge decline. This impact depends on load factor, which correlates 
with the likelihood of the PPSs’ entry and thus the keenness of competition. For users with a 
load factor of, say, 30%, competition lowered the power charge by about 4%.3 
 Nevertheless, ANRE (2004) did not take into account the decision-making process 
by which the PPSs decide whether to bid in individual auctions. The data imply that while 
the incumbents bid in almost all auctions, the PPSs seem to carefully select only profitable 
ones that they had a sufficiently high probability of winning so as not to bear bidding costs 
for auctions they were likely to lose. In fact, as ANRE (2004) pointed out, the PPSs focus on 
cases with a load factor of about 30–50%. This suggests that the scope of competition is 
endogenously determined by the PPSs’ bid-submission decision while the scope of 
deregulation is exogenously defined by the laws and ordinances.4 Therefore, if we simply 
                                                     
1 The average power charge is computed by dividing the winning bids (yen) by the (planned) power 
demand (kWh). We also use it as the power charge to examine in our study and simply call it the power 
charge unless otherwise indicated. 
2 (Annual average) load factor is defined as follows: 
 Load factor (%) = (planned) power demand(kWh) 
 /[contract demand(kW)*365(days)*24(hours)*contract period(year)]*100(%). 
Given the total power demand, lower load factor implies that capacity is more likely to be idle and thus 
that such customers are costly to serve. 
3 This is the authors’ estimate using the model developed by ANRE (2004). 
4 More precisely, in the public procurement cases, public entities can exceptionally accept power supply 
from the PPSs for the sake of transparency in public procurements even if the case is out of the scope of 
the retail market deregulation. However, such exceptional cases tend to be small-scale contracts and 
thus rarely put out to bid due to the transaction costs borne by public entities. 
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divide the original sample into these two subsamples using ex post information about the 
states of competition, we cannot estimate the true impact of the retail market deregulation 
through competition. 
 Hattori (2010) analyzed the bid submission by explaining the number of PPS 
bidders with attributes of individual auctions. Hattori (2010) found that the number of PPS 
bidders was increased by such factors as lower load factor, larger contract demand, and 
ultra-high voltage power supply, using a sample encompassing 949 public auctions for power 
supply starting in fiscal 2004–2006. He, however, did not investigate the impact of the 
number of PPS bidders or the state of competition on power charges. Hattori and Saegusa 
(2010) extended Hattori’s (2010) study with the auction data for 2008 to measure the impact 
of the regulation of bidders’ eligibility in regard to their carbon dioxide emissions on the 
number of bidders, PPSs’ winning probability, winners’ carbon dioxide emissions, and 
winning bids. They found that such environmental considerations raised the winning bids 
by 1.6 % through discouraging PPSs from submitting bids. 
 In this study, we use a dataset recording the results of about 500 public auctions in 
five regional markets in Japan, which observed some PPSs’ bids for the power supply 
scheduled to start in 2005 to investigate (A) what factors affected the PPSs’ bid-submission 
decision and (B) what factors determined the bids correcting the sample-selection bias 
caused by (A). By comparing the actual winning bids in the multiple bidder cases with the 
counter-factual bids predicted by supposing that only one bidder would have hypothetically 
submitted a bid in the same cases, we quantify the impact of the retail market deregulation 
on power charges through competition. Our results suggest that the competition 
significantly lowered the power charges by 0.48 yen/kWh on average. 
 Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide basic statistics of our public 
auction sample and suggest some econometric issues concerning the endogeneity of the PPSs’ 
bid-submission. Section 3 shows our strategies for estimating power charges correcting the 
sample-selection bias due to this endogeneity and for measuring the impact of the retail 
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market deregulation on power charges through competition. Section 4 shows our estimation 
results, followed by the concluding Section 5. 
 
2. Auction Data of Electric Power Procurement and 
Econometric Issues 
2.1 Electric Power Procurement Auction 
 Japan’s power market consumed 918 billion kWh in 2005, of which 560 billion kWh, 
or 61% of the total demand, was within the scope of the retail market deregulation. The 
PPSs covered only 11 billion kWh (1.2% of the total demand, 2.0% of the deregulated market 
demand). Our sample comprises public auctions for power supply to the government and 
other public entities which disclose details of the results about whether or not a single 
company bid in the five regions (Tokyo, Chubu, Kansai, Chugoku, and Kyushu) where the 
PPSs had ever bid. After conducting sample selection as discussed in Section 4, our sample 
encompasses 489 auctions, which planned to consume 4.9 billion kWh (0.9% of the total 
demand in the deregulated retail market) worth 57.3 billion yen. 
 The observed power charges (i.e., the winning bids) show a downward-sloping 
curve, reflecting the usual two-tier charge system based on capacity and demand charges 
(Figure 1). The descriptive statistics of our sample (after the sample selection) are shown by 
region in Table 1 and by load factor in Table 2. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note: UHV stands for ultra-high voltage. 
 
Table 2: Power Charges by Load Factor and the State of Competition 
 
 
 Table 2 suggests the popularity of competition between the incumbents and the 
Mean
Power
Charges
Share
of
UHV
Mean
Load
Factor
Mean
Contract
Demand
No.
of
Obs.
Region (yen/kWh) (%) (%) (kW)
Tokyo
Single Bidder 12.88 22.45 52.81 2177.29 12.35 [0.126] 1.07 [0.011] 98
Multiple Bidders 13.14 57.84 42.95 3001.07 17.74 [0.174] 1.53 [0.015] 102
Regional Total 13.07 40.50 47.78 2598.14 30.09 [0.151] 2.60 [0.013] 200
Chubu
Single Bidder 14.43 20.00 41.07 1305.12 7.58 [0.084] 0.62 [0.007] 90
Multiple Bidders 13.91 80.00 35.47 2267.50 1.87 [0.094] 0.15 [0.007] 20
Regional Total 14.33 30.91 40.05 1480.10 9.45 [0.086] 0.77 [0.007] 110
Kansai
Single Bidder 13.75 32.14 44.12 2057.00 3.11 [0.111] 0.27 [0.010] 28
Multiple Bidders 13.10 83.72 45.27 3780.19 7.98 [0.186] 0.71 [0.017] 43
Regional Total 13.36 63.38 44.82 3100.62 11.09 [0.156] 0.98 [0.014] 71
Chugoku
Single Bidder 14.79 17.65 41.70 1211.96 3.28 [0.064] 0.27 [0.005] 51
Multiple Bidders 14.37 55.56 36.48 2078.67 0.80 [0.089] 0.06 [0.007] 9
Regional Total 14.72 23.33 40.92 1341.97 4.08 [0.068] 0.34 [0.006] 60
Kyushu
Single Bidder 15.55 5.56 34.60 776.14 1.28 [0.036] 0.09 [0.003] 36
Multiple Bidders 13.78 50.00 39.94 2344.67 1.35 [0.112] 0.11 [0.009] 12
Regional Total 15.11 16.67 35.93 1168.27 2.63 [0.055] 0.20 [0.004] 48
Total
Single Bidder 14.06 19.80 44.48 1578.16 27.61 [0.091] 2.33 [0.008] 303
Multiple Bidders 13.31 65.59 42.17 3015.33 29.74 [0.160] 2.56 [0.014] 186
Total 13.78 37.22 43.60 2124.81 57.34 [0.117] 4.89 [0.010] 489
Total [Mean]
Bid
Total [Mean]
Power Demand
(bil. yen)  (bil. kWh)
Load
Factor
Mean
Power
Charges
(yen/kWh)
No.
of
Obs.
Mean
Power
Charges
(yen/kWh)
No.
of
Obs.
Mean
Power
Charges
(yen/kWh)
No.
of
Obs.
10–20％ 20.89 21 19.92 10 –0.97 32.26 20.57 31
20–40％ 15.98 112 14.61 77 –1.37 40.74 15.42 189
40–60％ 12.77 105 12.04 74 –0.73 41.34 12.47 179
60–80% 10.66 56 10.50 22 –0.16 28.21 10.62 78
80–100％ 10.30 9 10.09 3 –0.21 25.00 10.25 12
Total 14.06 303 13.31 186 –0.69 38.04 13.78 489
Single Bidder
Sample
Multiple Bidder
Sample
Whole
SampleDifference
of Mean
Power
Charges
(yen/kWh)
Share of
Multiple
Bidder
Sample
(%)
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PPSs––multiple bidders appear in 186 cases (38% of the whole sample) in the five regions. 
At a glance, the data suggest that the multiple bidder cases were likely to result in about 0.7 
yen/kWh lower charges on average than the single bidder cases. This is found more or less 
commonly in all load factor classes but is especially conspicuous in the load factor classes 
lower than 60%. Examining the winners of multiple-bidder auctions, we find the PPSs 
aggressively bid to almost completely beat the incumbents.5 This led to these significant bid 
charge gaps in these market segments. 
 It is notable that the PPSs’ bids were more highly concentrated upon the load 
factor range from 20 to 60%. About 80% of the multiple bidder cases were concentrated upon 
this range, although about 70% of the single bidder cases were there. This is probably 
because the customers with very high load factors had load profiles (i.e., a pattern of power 
demand within a day or a year) that matched well with the cheap power supplied by 
base-load plants (discussed below) and thus had already enjoyed the incumbents’ generous 
offers even before the deregulation. The incumbents were equipped with many base-load 
plants using cheap fuels like nuclear; nuclear power plants generate about one-third of 
Japan’s total power. In contrast, the PPSs were mainly equipped with small-scale oil-fueled 
thermal power plants for middle- or peak-load. The fuel costs for these are generally higher 
than the incumbents’, particularly during off-peak load times like night. Bids of the PPSs 
with plant portfolios focused on middle- or peak-load supply could hardly undercut those of 
the incumbents for such high load factor customers consuming power all day and night. 
Conversely, the PPSs could provide competitive offers to low load factor customers who had 
faced relatively high charges offered by the incumbents before the reform. 
 Table 1 again suggests that the PPSs were more likely to bid for the ultra-high 
                                                     
5 In 2005, no competition between the incumbents was observed at all in the public auctions. Moreover, 
due to our sample selection, the single bidder sample implies no companies but an incumbent bid; the 
multiple bidder sample does an incumbent and one or more PPSs bid. Therefore, the single bidder 
sample indicates the incumbents’ bid patterns; the multiple bidder one does the PPSs’. 
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voltage (20,000V or higher) power procurement cases. The share of the ultra-high-voltage 
cases in the multiple bidder cases is more than three times larger than that in the single 
bidder cases. This is because the wheeling charge, which was paid for uses of the 
incumbents’ network to transmit power to customers, was set lower for the ultra-high 
voltage power than for high voltage power. Thus, the PPSs were more likely to bid on the 
ultra-high voltage cases. 
 Contract demand (kW) is often highly correlated with the supply voltage for purely 
technological reasons. The contract demand of the multiple bidder sample is about twice as 
large as that of the single bidder sample. As bidding costs would depend little on the 
contract demand, power companies could more easily impute bidding costs to bid charges in 
larger-scale power supply cases and thus were more likely to bid in this market segment. 
 In this study, we aim to measure the magnitude of power charge declines 
attributable to competition that was induced by the retail market deregulation. As discussed 
above, this decline did not appear uniformly across the scope of the deregulation. That is, 
while auctions with the PPSs’ bids were likely to experience a charge decline, those without 
any PPSs’ bids led to only a smaller charge decline or a rise induced by the monopolistic 
behavior of power companies. To analyze this problem, we examine the bid-submission 
behavior of power companies and its endogeneity. 
 
2.2 Econometric Issues in the PPSs’ Endogenous Bid-submission 
Decision 
 Given the observations summarized above, we have to consider two situations 
regarding the state of competition in individual auctions. One is that there is no bidder other 
than an incumbent (the single bidder case); the other is that there is an incumbent and one 
or more PPSs competing with each other (the multiple bidder case). How much charge 
difference would arise between these two situations? By comparing the power charges 
observed in the actual multiple-bidder cases with counter-factual power charges which 
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would have been observed in the hypothetical single-bidder cases, we measure the effects of 
competition on power charges (Figure 2). In the following, we call this the “multiple-bidder 
effect.” 
 In Figure 2, we illustrate the schedules of their offers as downward-sloping curves 
that intersect with each other at some point. As discussed in Section 2.1, the incumbents 
usually had a comparative advantage in high load factor cases; the PPSs did in low load 
factor cases. Thus, the PPSs’ offer curve is steeper than the incumbents’. On one hand, the 
public notices about the results of auctions report no bids but the winning ones, which 
constitute the lower envelope of these two schedules. On the other hand, losing bids, 
including unobservable offers which power companies gave up making, are not publicly 
available. That is, there is no way at all to observe both the winning and losing bids made for 
individual auctions. Therefore, we need to develop a method to predict unobservable power 
charges under two different states of competition. 
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Figure 2: Observed Bids and Unobserved Offers 
 
PPSs’ offer Incumbents’ offer 
No bids by PPSs 
Bids by PPSs 
Power 
charge 
Load factor 
Multiple-bidder 
effect 
Observed bids
Unobserved offer 
 
Note: In general, the placements of these two offer schedules do not necessarily appear as 
Figure 2 illustrates. However, we draw this figure to illustrate the gist of our 
estimation result shown later. 
 
 Presuming the incumbents submit bids in all auctions, if the PPSs’ bid-submission 
is determined in a perfectly random manner irrespective of the attributes of auctions, we 
can measure the effect of competition on charges by comparing the means of the two groups’ 
power charges with and without PPSs’ bid as Wooldridge (2001) showed. However, Figure 1 
indicates some correlation between the likelihood of the PPSs’ bid-submission and the load 
factor. That is, the PPSs’ bid-submission decision is endogenously made more or less 
considering the attributes of auctions like load factor. If this is the case, our estimates of 
power charges will suffer from the sample selection bias. 
 Suppose the bid-submission decision is determined only by auctions’ observable 
attributes, such as load factor and users’ facility types, but independent of unobservable 
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factors affecting power charges, we can apply the propensity score method to generate 
weights to correct the sample selection bias due to the PPSs’ endogenous bid-submission 
decision.6 However, this approach will be found in vain when we have some unobservable 
factors which affect the PPSs’ bid-submission decision and (winning) bid charges, such as 
profiles of PPSs’ customers and their remaining supply capacity available at the point of 
their bid-submission decision. To remedy this, we can employ a proxy variable so as to take 
account of such private information like the supply capacity as discussed in Section 3. 
Nonetheless, if this proxy variable does not work enough to control for effects of such 
unobservable factors, the supply capacity still turns out one of unobservable factors causing 
such a bias. In sum, if the PPSs’ private information, exemplified by their supply capacity, 
affects the bid-submission decision and the power charges, we cannot make the 
bid-submission decision independent of the observed winning bid charges using any 
observable factors as explanatory variables. Consequently, any methods with the propensity 
scores, and still less the above-mentioned simple method of choosing the treatment and 
control group samples, cannot fully correct the sample-selection bias. 
 From the point of view of game-theory analysis, the auctions in our dataset are 
first-price sealed-bid auctions. There are two types of bidders: regional power companies and 
PPSs. Obviously, they are asymmetric players in company size and cost structure as well as 
their entry behavior, as mentioned above. Auction studies, such as Paarsh and Hong (2006) 
and Li and Zheng (2009), often call for a structural approach in the independent 
private-value paradigm. However, their empirical approaches, which use a simplifying 
assumption of symmetry among bidders, cannot be immediately taken in our case with such 
asymmetry. Although we may be able to extend their framework to the asymmetric case, 
lack of information about losing bidders and their bids leads to an insufficient sample size 
for this purpose. Therefore, we take a reduced-form approach here rather than a structural 
                                                     
6 About the propensity score method, see, for example, Dehejia and Wahba (2002). 
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one. 
 In the following, we elaborate our model to precisely measure the multiple-bidder 
effect. To this end, we describe the PPSs’ endogenous bid-submission decision and the 
winning bid charges with an explicit consideration about their interdependence through 
unobservable factors. 
 
3． Estimating Power Charges Considering Endogenous 
Bid-submission 
3.1 Modeling PPSs’ Endogenous Bid-submission 
 Let us indicate the competition state by the suffix j : the single bidder state 
( 0j ) and the multiple bidder state ( 1j ). Let ijy ,  and iy  denote the bid for the i-th 
auction in the j-th state of competition and the actual observation of power charges (i.e., the 
winning bid charges) in the i-th auction. The state of competition is determined by the PPSs’ 
bid-submission decision because the incumbents always submit bids. In sum, iy ,0  indicates 
the power charge observed in the i-th auction with a single bidder. PPSs are supposed to 
decide whether to bid or not in individual auctions considering attributes of auctions and 
PPSs’ own private factors. iy ,1  indicates the power charge observed in the i-th auction with 
multiple bidders (one incumbent and one or more PPSs). A dummy variable id  indicates 
PPSs’ bid-submission decision whether to bid (=1) or not (=0) in the i-th auction. 
 Every time PPSs submit a bid, they bear various bidding costs in each bid, such as 
costs for preparing bids, companies’ general and administrative expenses, and the 
opportunity costs of supply capacity consumed in the bid. Therefore, the PPSs will bid only 
when they anticipate high probability to win and earn enough profits. In other words, 
anticipating the incumbents’ bid choice *,0 iy , the PPSs make their bid choice 
*
,1 iy  given the 
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bidding costs (expressed in terms of yen per kWh) *ic  as follows. 
 

 
otherwise.
if
0
,1 **,1
*
,0 iii
i
cyy
d  
By specifying *,ijy  and *ic  as 
 
1,0,,,
*
,  juy ijjijij k , 
 iii vc  w* , 
we can boil down this system into the following binary choice model.7 
  01  iiid z .
 
     (1) 
Note that  1  in Eq. (1) is an indicator function which returns unity if the condition 
within the brackets holds, and zero otherwise. The vector iz  consists of observable factors 
included in the formulas characterizing *,ijy  and *ic ; i  encompasses unobservable factors 
iju ,  and iv  like PPSs’ private information about available capacity, customer profiles, 
plant development plans, and so on, used in their bid-submission decision and bid choice. 
 In our estimation, we use load factor (%) as one of the explanatory variables in iz , 
following ANRE (2004) and Hattori (2010). As indicated in Table 4, we also include the 
supply voltage dummy (ultra-high voltage=1, high voltage=0), the contract demand size 
(kW), and regional dummies for the Tokyo area, the Chubu area, the Kansai area and other 
areas as the explanatory variables. 
                                                     
7 In this study, we develop a model that presumes one representative PPS in the market; however, in 
reality there are several PPSs behaving individually. If we explicitly model the number of PPSs 
participating in competition following Hattori (2010), we can consider the effect of variable degrees of 
competition among power companies. However, as there were many auctions which did not disclose the 
number of bidders, our sample size becomes considerably small in this approach. Therefore, we omit 
the details of the model in this regard. 
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Table 3 Average Load Factor by Facility Type 
 
 
 As the facility type implies miscellaneous information like a load profile, we set up 
seven facility type categories as shown in Table 3. Given these categories, our dataset 
includes only one multiple-bidder observation in the garbage facility group; we merge the 
garbage facility group into the office building and others group to avoid problems due to 
multicollinearity in our estimation. Thus, we use five facility dummies in our model while 
choosing the “office building and others” as the reference type. Lastly, we prepare a proxy 
variable of the PPSs’ supply capacity, which is computed as a ratio of the contract demand 
(kW) of individual auctions to the total supply capacity held by the nine largest PPSs 12 
months prior to the beginning of the contract period.8 
 
3.2 Modeling Determinants of Power Charges 
 Given the bid-submission decision id  discussed above, our power charge function 
for the i-th auction is formulated as: 
 1,0,,  jy ijjiij x ,     (2) 
                                                     
8 Data source: “Denryoku chosa tokei geppo (Monthly power demand survey)” by the ANRE. 
Mean
Load
Factor
S.D.
No.
of
Obs.
Mean
Load
Factor
S.D.
No.
of
Obs.
Mean
Load
Factor
S.D.
No.
of
Obs.
(%) (%) (%)
Water & Sewage 59.52 18.01 97 51.60 16.18 10 58.78 17.99 107
Road 48.27 9.50 3 41.77 17.24 11 43.16 16.13 14
Garbage 40.50 20.30 11 69.56 0.00 1 42.92 21.03 12
School 40.75 12.37 11 41.80 11.20 15 41.36 11.72 26
Hospital 46.59 9.31 35 49.32 8.20 30 47.85 8.92 65
Market 34.19 5.81 4 45.69 0.80 3 39.12 7.21 7
Office Building & Others 34.50 13.19 142 39.27 15.01 116 36.64 14.23 258
Total 44.48 18.42 303 42.17 14.69 186 43.60 17.13 489
Single Bidder Sample Multiple Bidder Sample  Whole Sample
Type of Facility
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-01
Retail Power Market Competition with Endogenous Entry Decision--An Auction Data Analysis Page 16 
 iiiii ydydy ,0,1 )1(  .     (3) 
In this model, we take account both of observable factors ix  and unobservable ones ij , . 
The former encompasses load factor (%), the ultra-high voltage dummy, the regional 
dummies, the facility type dummies, the contract period (year), and the logarithm of 
contract demand (kW). Regarding the load factor, Figure 1 suggests that the power charge 
sharply falls when the load factor is low and gradually converges to about 10 yen/kWh as the 
load factor approaches 40% or higher. In estimating the effects of the load factor on the 
power charges, we take two alternative approaches to cope with such nonlinearities in the 
load factor curves; one is the parametric approach incorporating linear, quadratic, and 
inverse terms of load factor, and the other is the nonparametric approach approximating the 
power charge curves by some flexible curves. 
 To estimate the unknown parameters in Eqs. (1) and (2), we have to introduce 
several assumptions about the model. First, we assume that the unobservable factors i  
and ij ,  follow an independent multivariate t-distribution (Kotz and Nadarajah (2004)) 
with   degrees of freedom. Equivalently, we assume the scale mixture density of )',( , iij   
and i , where 
 niN
jj
jjj
jjii
i
ij ...,,2,1,
1
),,0(~|
2
1, 





 


 ΩΩ , (4) 
and )2/,2/(~  gammai . The system consisting of Eqs. (1)–(4) is called an endogenous 
regime-switching regression model.9  
The model consisting of Eqs. (1)–(3) with the parametric load factor curves, or with 
the nonparametric ones, is estimated by a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. 
Following the estimation methods by Chib (2007) and Chib and Jeliazkov (2006), we 
                                                     
9 See, for example, Heckman (1976) and Maddala (1983). 
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describe the details of our slightly modified algorithm in the Appendix. In Section 4, we 
present our estimation results. 
 
3.3 Definition of the Multiple Bidder Effect and its Estimation 
 Given Eqs. (1)–(3), we measure the multiple bidder effect, which captures the gaps 
between the power charges in the multiple bidder state and those in the single bidder state. 
We define the multiple bidder effect as follows: 
  1|,0,1  iii dyyET .      (5) 
This multiple bidder effect T  compares, given the PPSs’ bid ( 1id ), the mean of actual 
power charges observed in the multiple bidder state  1|,1 ii dyE  with that of 
counter-factual power charges computed for the same auctions in the hypothetical single 
bidder state  1|,0 ii dyE . Graphically speaking, this effect corresponds to the gap 
between the two offer schedules only for market segments with lower load factors than that 
indicated by the intersection of these two schedules in Figure 2. If the competition induced 
by the deregulation successfully promotes competition to lower charges, the measurement 
T  turns out negative. 
 In addition, we can define more detailed measurement. As discussed in Section 2.1, 
the keenness of competition between the incumbents and the PPSs differs depending on the 
auctions’ attributes, particularly load factor and the supply voltage type. We measure the 
multiple bidder effect in each market segment characterized by these two attributes. Let l  
and k  ( Kk ...,,2,1 ) denote load factor (or the supply voltage type) and its intervals 
indicating the market segments. We define the measurement of the multiple bidder effect in 
the k-th particular market segment as follows. 
    kiiik ldyyET  ,1|,0,1 .    (5’) 
 In the following, we use the public procurement auction data to estimate the 
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system consisting of Eqs. (1)–(4) and measure (5) and (5’) with the estimated model. As 
Heckman et al. (2003) showed, the estimators )(θnT  and  knT ,θ  are the sample 
analogues to T  and  kT   for a given parameter θ , respectively: 
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         (6’)
 where kif ,  is a dummy variable being unity if the i-th sample is within the k-th market 
segment k , but zero otherwise. The estimates are obtained by integrating out the 
parameters from )(θnT  and  knT ,θ  after being weighted with the posterior density. 
These are simply the averages of )(θnT  and  knT ,θ  evaluating the parameter values 
from the MCMC outputs. Moreover, we apply the same method to define the detailed 
measurements of the multiple-bidder effect for the market segments characterized by the 
supply voltage type. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Bid-submission Decision and the Power Charge Function 
 Prior to our estimation, we conduct the following sample selections. First, we 
exclude nine observations with load factor lower than 10%, which are few but show 
extremely high charges as Figure 1 suggests, to avoid their unreasonably large impact on 
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our estimation results.10 Second, we also exclude eight observations where no incumbents’ 
bids were observed. As we aim to estimate power charges by modeling the PPSs’ behavior 
while presuming the incumbents’ bid submission, such observations are not considered here. 
 While we present our main estimation results obtained with parametric 
specifications (including the linear, quadratic, and inverse term of load factor) with 
t-distributed error terms discussed in the Appendix, we have also tried some alternative 
specifications regarding the load-factor–related variables, e.g., with and without a higher 
order term of load factor, load factor curve specified by a nonparametric function, or with 
and without the facility type dummies, which are expected to be highly correlated with load 
factor as Table 3 shows. Comparing their estimation results with each other in view of the 
log-marginal likelihood statistics (Chib and Jeliazkov (2005)) and the deviance information 
criterion (DIC, Spiegelhalter et al. (2002)), we choose the specification with a parametric 
polynomial of load factor and the t-distributed error term.11 While specifications omitting 
the facility type dummies lead to a considerably low log-marginal likelihood, we do not find 
any significant differences in our estimates of the multiple bidder effect shown in Section 4.2. 
Table 4 presents our estimation results by the MCMC estimation method with Ox version 
5.10 (Doornik (2007)).12 
 The second tier of Table 4 shows our estimation results of the PPSs’ bid-submission 
function (1). Although Hattori (2010) found lower load factor led to a higher likelihood of 
PPSs’ bid-submission, our results do not imply so. This is because the facility type dummies 
                                                     
10 Those excluded samples are auctions for garbage incinerator plants (seven samples) and baseball 
stadiums (two samples). The former are equipped with garbage-fueled thermal power generators and 
consume auxiliary power purchased from power companies. The latter consume electricity only 
occasionally within a day and a year. They may well be regarded as abnormal samples. 
11 See Section A.2 in the Appendix for this details. 
12 In this study, we use the level of average power charges as the dependent variable; no significant 
difference is found in our results even if we use their logarithms. 
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are highly correlated with their load factor as discussed above and capture most of this effect 
on the PPSs’ bid-submission decision. In fact, the estimated coefficient of the water and 
sewage facility dummy, which has the highest load factor among the seven facility type 
categories shown in Table 3, turns out significantly negative. This implies that the PPSs 
were less willing to bid for such facility cases than the others. 
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Table 4 Estimation Results 
 
Note: ** and * indicate significant at 5% and 10% significance levels. 
 UHV stands for ultra-high voltage. 
Estmates S.D. t-value p-value Estmates S.D. t-value p-value
Constant 0.1838 0.0415 4.43 0.00 ** 0.1628 0.0151 10.76 0.00 **
UHV Dummy –0.0143 0.0028 –5.12 0.00 ** –0.0062 0.0014 –4.32 0.00 **
Load Factor –0.0736 0.0563 –1.31 0.19 –0.1258 0.0222 –5.66 0.00 **
(Load Factor)2 0.0494 0.0457 1.08 0.28 0.0818 0.0172 4.75 0.00 **
(Load Factor)–1 0.0148 0.0023 6.34 0.00 ** 0.0131 0.0009 14.25 0.00 **
Regional Dummy
Tokyo –0.0020 0.0025 –0.78 0.44 0.0000 0.0011 0.00 1.00
Chubu –0.0016 0.0027 –0.60 0.55 0.0012 0.0009 1.37 0.17
Kansai 0.0026 0.0026 1.00 0.32 0.0031 0.0014 2.30 0.02 **
Contract Demand –0.0100 0.0085 –1.18 0.24 –0.0037 0.0037 –0.99 0.32
(Contract Demand)2 0.0003 0.0005 0.60 0.55 0.0001 0.0003 0.42 0.67
Contract Period –0.0004 0.0024 –0.16 0.87 0.0012 0.0008 1.56 0.12
Facility Dummy
Water & Sewage –0.0014 0.0035 –0.40 0.69 –0.0063 0.0012 –5.45 0.00 **
Road –0.0111 0.0027 –4.07 0.00 ** –0.0084 0.0036 –2.29 0.02 **
School –0.0004 0.0027 –0.16 0.87 0.0003 0.0019 0.15 0.88
Hospital 0.0037 0.0019 1.98 0.05 ** 0.0029 0.0012 2.37 0.02 **
Market 0.0058 0.0049 1.17 0.24 –0.0097 0.0030 –3.21 0.00 **
PPSs' Bid-submission Function: Eq. (1)
Constant –5.4809 12.3160 –0.45 0.66
UHV Dummy 1.7040 0.2405 7.08 0.00 **
Load Factor –2.7779 1.8924 –1.47 0.14
Regional Dummy
Tokyo 1.1623 0.2044 5.69 0.00 **
Chubu –0.1555 0.2432 –0.64 0.52
Kansai 0.7674 0.2531 3.03 0.00 **
Contract Demand 2.0079 1.1022 1.82 0.07 *
(Contract Demand)2 –0.1392 0.0530 –2.62 0.01 **
Supply Capacity –0.4207 0.5137 –0.82 0.41
Contract Period 0.1843 0.7248 0.25 0.80
Facility Dummy
Water & Sewage –1.4991 0.2485 –6.03 0.00 **
Road 0.0024 0.4833 0.01 1.00
School 0.5280 0.3443 1.53 0.13
Hospital 0.1774 0.2253 0.79 0.43
Market 0.1438 0.6312 0.23 0.82
σ1 0.0083 0.0007 12.81 0.00 **
σ0 0.0059 0.0002 24.56 0.00 **
ρ1 –0.4422 0.2580 –1.71 0.09 *
ρ0 –0.0059 0.1935 –0.03 0.98
R2 (Adj.-R2)
Power Charge Function: Eq. (2)
under the Multiple Bidder State 0.902 (0.894)
under the Single Bidder State 0.954 (0.952)
PPSs' Bid-submission Function: Eq. (1) 0.853
Log-likelihood 1543.5
The Number of Observations 489
o/w Multiple Bidder Cases 186
Power Charge Function: Eq. (2)
under the Multiple Bidder State under the Single Bidder State
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 The (logarithm of) contract demand (kW) is found to give positive and significant 
impact on the PPSs’ bid-submission decision. Regarding the supply voltage type, as Hattori 
(2010) found, the ultra-high voltage cases were likely to attract PPSs’ bid. The regional 
dummies imply that the PPSs were more likely to bid in Tokyo and Kansai, where many 
PPSs’ headquarters and branches are located. The measure of goodness of fit for our 
estimated function is about 85% in view of its prediction accuracy, which implies the PPSs’ 
bid-submission model (1) can successfully estimate the PPSs’ decision.13 
 The first tier of Table 4 shows our estimation results of the power charge function 
(2). The left panel, showing the power charge function with the PPSs’ bid-submission, 
indicates that only the inverse term of load factor had significant impact on power charges. 
Given this functional form capturing the non-linear effect of load factor, its importance 
sharply diminishes as load factor increases and is visible as long as the load factor is no 
higher than 40%. 
 The coefficients of the facility type dummies indicate that while hospitals and road 
facilities had a similar load factor, hospitals had higher bid charges; road facilities had lower 
charges (than office buildings and others). As the effect of the load factor is controlled for by 
its explanatory variables, we can interpret the coefficients of the facility type dummies as 
purely reflecting the differences of facilities’ characteristics, such as load profiles. For 
example, road facilities consumed power mainly at night and enjoyed relatively lower 
                                                     
13 While using the standard R2 measure for Eq. (2), we use the odds ratio as a measure of goodness of fit 
for our binary choice model of Eq. (1). While the dependent variable takes zero or unity for individual 
auctions, we set its predicted values at unity when )ˆ( iZ  exceeds 0.5, but at zero otherwise. If the 
predicted values match their actual observations id , the prediction is accurate, and vice versa. The 
overall measure is computed by the share of accurate predictions in the whole sample. For more on the 
measures of goodness of fit, see Estrella (1998). 
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charges, because their load profile better matched power supply by base-load power plants 
bearing cheap fuel costs. However, hospitals’ load profile did not match the cheap power 
supply. Higher load factor and ultra-high voltage power supply led to significantly lower 
power charges as the earlier studies often pointed out. Compared with the results on the left 
panel, the right panel, showing the results of the power charge function without any PPSs’ 
bid, indicates that the key factors affected the winning bid in a similar way and to a greater 
magnitude. 
 The third tier of Table 4 shows our estimation results of j  – the coefficients of 
correlation between the unobservable factors (i.e., i  in the PPSs’ bid-submission function 
(1) and ij ,  in the power charge function (2)). The significance of the coefficient of 
correlation 1  between i  and i,1  implies, given the multiple bidder state that occurred, 
the PPSs’ bid-submission decision was not independent of the power charge determination 
and that omitting their simultaneity generally led to biased estimates as discussed in 
Section 2.2. Thus, we cannot find the true impact of the retail market deregulation through 
competition by simply comparing observed charges between two subsample groups, 
distinguished only by observable factors such as the PPSs’ bid-submission, load factor, and 
facility types. Moreover, the insignificance of the coefficient of correlation 0  between i  
and i,0  implies the incumbents’ bids did not have anything to do with the PPSs’ 
bid-submission. In other words, the incumbents did not behave strategically in response to 
any actions by the PPSs. 
 
4.2 Measuring the Multiple-Bidder Effect 
 Using our model shown above, we measure the multiple-bidder effect by (6) and (6’). 
Our estimates of the multiple-bidder effect  1|0,1  ii dYYE , which is typically indicated 
by the gap between the two schedules only for the left side to their intersection in Figure 2, 
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are computed by comparing the actual winning bid charges under the multiple bidder state 
 1|,1 ii dYE  with the counter-factual bid charges under the hypothetical single bidder 
state  1|,0 ii dYE . Table 5 indicates the power charge was cut by 0.48 yen/kWh due to 
competition on average. Examining the multiple-bidder effect by load factor class, the power 
charge declined by 0.45–0.54 yen/kWh in the load factor range from 20 to 60%, on which the 
PPSs concentrated their bids. This is followed by the decline of 0.42 yen/kWh in the market 
segment with a load factor of 60–80%. In the 80–100% load factor segment, although a 
significant decline is indicated, it cannot be a reliable estimate considering its sample size 
(=12) and given our estimation strategy. 
 
Table 5: Multiple-bidder Effects 
 
Note: * indicates significant at the 10% significance level.  
 
 While the descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that the charge differences by 
competition state were 1.37 and 0.73 yen/kWh in the market segments with the load factors 
of 20–40% and 40–60%, the multiple-bidder effect reported in Table 5 (i.e., 0.54 and 0.45 
yen/kWh) appears much smaller. This is not only due to the factors other than the load 
factor, but also due to the endogeneity of the PPSs’ bid-submission decision as discussed in 
Section 2.2. That is, the true impact of competition induced by the retail market 
Estimates
(yen/kWh)
–0.484 * [ –0.771 , –0.202 ]
Subsample
10–20% –0.306 [ –0.829 , 0.226 ]
20–40% –0.543 * [ –0.837 , –0.255 ]
40–60% –0.454 * [ –0.749 , –0.162 ]
60–80% –0.420 * [ –0.786 , –0.056 ]
80–100% –0.760 * [ –1.315 , –0.209 ]
Ultra-high –0.710 * [ –0.991 , –0.432 ]
High –0.053 [ –0.423 , 0.307 ]
Load
Factor
90% credible intervals
Supply
Voltage
All Sample
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deregulation would be about half of the charge differences observed in such a casual 
comparison. 
 We do not find the multiple-bidder effect to be large; this is due to differences in 
resource endowments and available technologies between the incumbents and the PPSs. 
The PPSs’ supply capacity was far from enough to serve all customers in the deregulated 
market: only 2% of the demand of the deregulated power market or about half of the power 
demand was examined in our auction data. Thus, it would be reasonable for us to infer that 
the PPSs could not compete on an equal footing with the incumbents in all market segments 
and instead each concentrated on its own niche, typically low load factor customers, and 
undercut the incumbents’ bids slightly. 
 As for the market segments defined by supply voltage, we can discuss the PPSs’ 
behavior in the same manner. In the ultra-high voltage cases, where relatively low wheeling 
charges are applied, the PPSs were more likely to bid to bring the multiple-bidder effect as 
high as 0.71 yen/kWh; however, the high voltage users were found to be less profitable for 
the PPSs and faced relatively higher bid charges offered mainly by the incumbents. In other 
words, the scope of competition was limited to the ultra-high voltage segment. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 In this study, we have investigated the impact of the retail market deregulation on 
power charges through competition between the incumbents and the PPSs using public 
auction data. Contingent on the PPSs’ bid-submission emulating the incumbents’ bids, the 
power charges were cut by 0.48 yen/kWh on average. However, the scope of competition was 
limited mainly by the PPSs’ supply capacity; there were many cases without any PPSs bids. 
Therefore, the impact of the retail market deregulation on the scope of competition and thus 
the charge declines achieved through competition will be heavily dependent on the present 
and future investment strategy of the PPSs. 
 In these ten years, commercial and industrial power charges have been decreased 
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by 1.8 yen/kWh per annum in nominal terms. This decline can be attributed partly to the 
regulatory reforms, as Kainou (2007) discussed. By examining power procurement auction 
data, we measured the magnitude of the multiple-bidder effect. The data indicated that 
greater competition induced by the retail market reform contributed to the evolution of 
power charges. 
 Our sample only consists of power supply auctions starting in 2005. For the sake of 
transparency of public procurement, the number of auctions has been increasing year by 
year. In future work, we should append data for more recent years to our original sample to 
analyze how the bid-submission decision and the multiple-bidder effect have evolved in 
these years.  
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Appendix: Markov Chain Monte Carlo Method for the Estimation 
of Endogenous Regime-Switching Regression Model 
 
A.1 Detailed Model Specification 
 To separate the effects of load factor on the power charge or the bidding decision 
from those of other explanatory variables, we rewrite models (1) and (2) as follows. 
 }0)({1  iidii lgd z ,     (1’) 
 1,0)( ,,  jlgy ijijjiij x ,     (2’) 
where the variable il  represents the load factor level, and )( id lg  and )( ij lg  are the 
effects of the load factor on the dependent variable. The variables iz  and ix  are the other 
explanatory variables. 
 We first consider the parametric specification of the load factor curve )( ij lg  in 
the most general parametric form as follows. 
djllllllg jiijijijijijij ,1,0)(
2
5,
1
4,
3
3,
2
2,1,   κl . 
With this specification, this standard switching regression model,
 }0{1}0{1}0{1 *  iiiidiii dd  γzκlγz ,  (1’) 
 1,0,,,  jy ijjiijdijiij  βxκlβx ,   (2’) 
can be estimated by the same method as Chib (2007). We briefly describe our estimation 
procedure. 
 Let jy and jX denote the dependent variable vector and the matrix of the 
explanatory variables in (2’) for the competition state j ; let *jd  and jZ  denote the latent 
variable vector and the matrix of the explanatory variables in (1’) for the subsample under 
the competition state j . Error terms are 
jjjjjjj
βXyηγZdε  ,* . The vector 
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jλ  consists of the scale mixture variables for the competition state j , and the diagonal 
matrix jΛ  has jλ  as its diagonal elements. For the use in the posterior densities, we 
introduce the following notations. 







1
0
0
1 **
jjj dyy , 
  









0
1
,
0
1
)1(,* jjjj jj ZXXX . 
 To implement the MCMC method, we set the prior distributions for parameters in 
the following manner. The prior distribution of ),,(
01
 γββδ  is an independent 
multivariate normal distribution with mean b  and variance B  (i.e., ),(~ Bbδ N )14 .  
Reparameterizing jjj    and 222 jjj   , the prior distributions are 
)2/,2/(~2 qrj Gamma inverse  and ),(~| 22 MmN jjj  . 15  Finally, the prior 
distribution of   is also a gamma distribution: )2/,2/(~  Gamma .16 Since all 
conditional posteriors but   are explicitly derived in Chib (2007), the Gibbs sampling 
algorithm can be applied. We sample the conditional posterior of   by the Metropolis–
Hastings acceptance–rejection algorithm proposed by Watanabe (2001). We summarize the 
sampling procedure as follows. 
1. Sample 1,0
2 )},{( jjj   given δ , *d , λ ,  , and ( yZX ,, ). 
(1-1)  2/)(,2/)(~2 jjj Nqnr Gamma inverse , 
where )()()( 1 jjjjjjjj mMmN εηεεΛεη   , and jn  is the length of 
                                                     
14 We set b  as a zero vector and B  as 100 times an identity matrix. 
15 We set 4r
 
, 2q , 0m , and 10M . 
16 We set 15  . 
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jy . 
(1-2) Given 2j , sample  1212 ,~|   jjjjjj FGFN   
where jjjj MF εΛε 1 , and jjjj MmG εΛη 1 . 
2. Sample )ˆ,ˆ(~ Dδδ N  given 1,02 )},{( jjj  , *d , λ ,  , and ( yZX ,, ), where
  *0100'*0*1111'*111 )()(ˆˆ yΩΛXyΩΛXbBDδ   ,
   1*0100'*0*1111'*11 )()(ˆ   XΩΛXXΩΛXBD . 
3. Sample the latent variables *d  given 1,0
2 )},{( jjj  , δ , λ ,  , and ( yZX ,, ): for 
the subsample in the competition state j , *d j  is sampled from t-distribution with 
location parameter jjjjj ηγZ  )/( 22  , scale parameters )/( 222 jjj   ,   
degrees of freedom, and truncated below zero if 1j , or above zero if 0j .  
4. Sample the latent variables λ  given 1,02 )},{( jjj  , δ , *d ,  , and ( yZX ,, ): for 
each i , )2/)(,2/)2((~ ii L  gamma , where 
2222 /}){( jjjjjjiL    . 
5. Sample   given 1,02 )},{( jjj  , δ , *d , λ , and ( yZX ,, ): The conditional posterior 
density of   is given as follows, 
)2/,2/;(ln
2
ln
2
2
2
ln
2
ln
2
)(ln
11
 





  gnnvf n
i
i
n
i
i , 
where )(  is gamma function, and )2/,2/;( g  is a gamma density function. 
We select the mode of the posterior density of  , denoted as * . Define the first and 
the second order derivative of  fln  at *  as A  and B , and the Taylor 
expansion of )(ln vf  around *  up to the second order as 
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2*** )(5.0)()(ln)(ln vvBvvAvfvh  . To compute a candidate of new  , x  
is generated from the following acceptance-rejection algorithm. 
i. ),/(~ 1*  BBANx   
ii. Accept x  with probability )(/)( xhxf . 
The accepted x  is a candidate of new  . The next step decides whether the current 
value of   is updated to the candidate x  by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm as 
described below: 
iii. If 1)(/)( vhvf  holds, then set 1),( vx . 
iv. If 1)(/)( vhvf , in addition,  
if 1)(/)( xhxf , then set )(/)(),( vfvhvx  , 
if 1)(/)( xhxf , then set }1,)]()(/[)]()([min{),( xhvfxfvhvx  . 
v. Update the current   by x  with probability ),( vx , or leave   unchanged. 
6. Repeat 1 through 5. The posterior mean estimates are calculated by an MCMC run of 
length 20,000 draws, following a burn-in cycle of 10,000 draws. 
 
A.2 The Estimation Procedure for the Nonparametric Specification 
 To explain the nonparametric specification of )( ij lg , some additional notations 
are needed. Assume that the curve )( ij lg  is evaluated at the p-grid points },,,{ 21 paaa  , 
where 1a  ( pa ) is set to be equal to, or smaller (larger) than the minimum (maximum) value 
of il . In our estimation, we set the number of grid points to 40. The lengths between the 
grid points are denoted as ptaah ttt ,,3,2,1   . For an observation il , the curve 
)( ij lg  is given by the internally dividing point using the nearest two grid points 1ka  and 
ka : 
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Therefore, we approximate the curve )(lg j  by a piecewise linear fitting. If we set all the 
weight values other than )(kiw  and 
)1( k
iw  to be zero and regard kjg ,  as parameters, then 
)( ij lg  becomes a linear combination of weights iw  and unknown parameters jg , where 
),,,( )()2()1( piiii www w  and ),,,( ,2,1, pjjjj ggg g . Following Chib and Jeliazkov 
(2006) and Chib et al. (2009), we assume the prior distribution of the grid point values, 
))(,ˆ(~| 11212   HDHgHg gjjjj N  ,     (7) 
where ,0),,,,( 1,,3,2,  jpjjjj gggg g
 
},,,{ 43 pg hhhGdiag D , and 
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H . 
We set 40 equally-spaced values over the range of load factor observations in our sample for 
the grid points. Also we set the parameter 0ˆ jg  and G =10 to equip the load factor 
curves with sufficient flexibility. 
 The load factor curve is denoted as jiij lg gw )( , thus, equations (1) and (2) are 
 }0{1}0{1}0{1 *  iiiidiii dd  γzgwγz ,  (1”) 
 1,0,,,  jy ijjiijjijiij  βxgwβx ,   (2”) 
where iw  is the vector without the first element of iw . This is also a standard switching 
regression model with an additional smoothness parameter 2j . Therefore, we must modify 
those two steps in the MCMC algorithm discussed above. The first is that the posterior of 
),,( 01  γββδ  must reflect (7) in the following manner. 
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The second modification is inserting the sampling step for the smoothness parameters of the 
nonparametric curves 2j , dj ,0,1 . When the prior distribution of 2j  is given as 
)2/,2/(~2 jjj  Gamma inverse , then the conditional posterior density is derived as 
)2/)(,2/)1(( jjj p  Gamma inverse , where 
)ˆ)(()ˆ( 1 jjgjjj ggHDHgg   .17 The modification of the MCMC algorithm for this 
case is completed by inserting the sampling step for 2j , dj ,0,1 , before the sampling 
step for  . 
Note that the models (1”)–(2”) have several variants. For example, only the load 
factor curve in the selection equation )( id lg  takes a simple parametric form while the 
others are nonparametrically specified. We compare various models in terms of the marginal 
likelihood, computed by the method of Chib and Jeliazkov (2005), or the DIC. Table I shows 
that the most favorable model specification is model 4 equipped with the t-distributed error 
terms and with the parametric load factor curves for both the selection and the participation 
equations. 
 
                                                     
17  We set 6j  and 01.0j . 
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Table I: Results of Model Comparisons 
 
DIC
Power Charge
Function: Eq. (2)
PPSs' Bid-
submission
Function: Eq. (1)
Model 1 –886.08 (0.05) 1527.1 normal parametric parametric
Model 2 –934.52 (0.07) 1553.3 normal nonparametric parametric
Model 3 –923.58 (0.74) 1557.6 normal nonparametric nonparametric
Model 4 –822.51 (0.33) 1401.3 t distribution parametric parametric
Model 5 –849.06 (0.51) 1421.5 t distribution nonparametric parametric
Model 6 –855.06 (0.15) 1426.0 t distribution nonparametric nonparametric
Log-marginal
likelihood
(std. error)
Model specifications
Distribution of
error terms
Effects of load factor
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